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What you'll learn: how to run AI governance as engineering: keep a registry of AI systems, classify each one against the EU AI Act's risk tiers using the official text, record audit evidence per decision, trace an answer back to its source document, document models and systems, and place human oversight where it works. Not legal advice; the legal text was checked on 2026-10-22.
At a glance
Figure 1. From inventory to evidence
flowchart LR
accTitle: From inventory to evidence
accDescr: An inventory of AI systems feeds risk classification. Classification drives the system card and the controls. Controls write to a write-once audit log. Monitoring and incidents loop back to classification through change control, and the card, the log and the monitoring records form the evidence pack for an auditor.
INV["AI system inventory"] --> CLS["Risk classification"]
CLS --> DOC["System card and records"]
CLS --> CTL["Controls: oversight, logging, disclosure"]
CTL --> LOG["Audit log (write-once)"]
CTL --> MON["Monitoring and incidents"]
MON -- "incident or change" --> CHG["Change control"]
CHG --> CLS
DOC --> EVD["Evidence pack for an auditor"]
LOG --> EVD
MON --> EVD
How to read this: governance is the loop on the left (list, classify, control, monitor, change); the evidence pack on the right is what that loop leaves behind.
- Governance is a set of records your systems produce while they run, not a policy document.
- Start with an inventory: a system that is not listed cannot be classified, monitored or switched off.
- The risk tier follows the intended use, not the model, so record the intended purpose per system.
- Log what lets a reviewer rebuild a decision, in storage the application team cannot edit, for no longer than its purpose needs.
- Human oversight is a designed checkpoint with measurable behaviour, such as an override rate.
- The law moves: this page quotes the official text as checked on 2026-10-22; check again before relying on it.
The real-world problem
An internal assistant has helped screen applications for six months. An auditor asks three questions: which prompt version produced last Tuesday's recommendation, who reviewed it, and which policy document it relied on. Nobody can answer without a week of digging. Governance makes them a query.
After this page you will be able to
- Write a registry record for an AI system with the fields an auditor asks for.
- Classify five scenarios against Article 6 and Annex III using the quoted text, and recognise when the honest answer is "ask counsel".
- Design a per-decision audit record, a retention rule and a tamper-evident store.
- Trace an answer from a source document version to the person who approved it.
- Place oversight checkpoints and measure whether they work.
Prerequisites and cross-links
Terms: AI system inventory, intended purpose, high-risk AI system, audit trail, data lineage, model card, system card and automation bias.
Not legal advice. Date checked: 2026-10-22. This page quotes the official text of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 and says what official EU pages said on that date. What applies to your organisation depends on your role, each system's intended purpose and national law. Ask qualified counsel, and check the official pages again: the text and its dates have been amended and may change again.
Core concepts
A registry of AI systems
Figure 2. The registry: one system, many versions, many decisions
erDiagram
accTitle: AI system registry
accDescr: One AI system has one risk record, many versions and many incidents. Each version has one system card, many evaluation runs and produces many decision log entries.
AI_SYSTEM ||--|| RISK_RECORD : "classified by"
AI_SYSTEM ||--o{ SYSTEM_VERSION : "has"
AI_SYSTEM ||--o{ INCIDENT : "has"
SYSTEM_VERSION ||--|| SYSTEM_CARD : "described by"
SYSTEM_VERSION ||--o{ EVAL_RUN : "tested by"
SYSTEM_VERSION ||--o{ DECISION_LOG : "produces"
AI_SYSTEM {
string system_id PK
string owner
string intended_purpose
string role
}
SYSTEM_VERSION {
string version_id PK
string model_id
string prompt_version
string retrieval_config
}
How to read this: the risk record hangs off the system because the intended purpose does; everything that changes with a release hangs off the version.
Article 3(12) defines intended purpose, and Article 3(3) and 3(4) define provider and deployer. A team that wraps a third-party model in its own assistant may be either or both: a legal question, so the registry records the answer and its date.
Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, Article 3(12). ‘intended purpose’ means the use for which an AI system is intended by the provider, including the specific context and conditions of use, as specified in the information supplied by the provider in the instructions for use, promotional or sales materials and statements, as well as in the technical documentation;
Check yourself: two teams call the same model API. One builds a canteen menu assistant, the other an application filter. Which registry field makes their obligations differ?
The intended purpose and context of use. Article 3(12) ties intended purpose to the specific context, and Annex III (next section) lists uses, not models.
Risk tiers and the text that defines them
Figure 3. Reading the classification text (a study aid, not the legal test)
flowchart TD
accTitle: Reading the EU AI Act classification text
accDescr: A system with an intended purpose is first checked against Article 6(1) for products under Annex I law. If not, it is checked against the Annex III areas. An Annex III system that performs profiling is high-risk. Otherwise the Article 6(3) conditions are tested and, if met, the assessment is documented. A separate Article 50 check applies to systems that talk to people or generate content.
S["System and its intended purpose"] --> A1{"Article 6(1): Annex I product needing third-party conformity assessment?"}
A1 -- yes --> H1["High-risk (Article 6(1))"]
A1 -- no --> A3{"Intended use in an Annex III area? (Article 6(2))"}
A3 -- no --> T{"Talks to people or generates content? (Article 50)"}
A3 -- yes --> P{"Profiling of natural persons?"}
P -- yes --> H2["High-risk, no Article 6(3) exception"]
P -- no --> C3{"An Article 6(3) condition met?"}
C3 -- no --> H3["High-risk (Article 6(2))"]
C3 -- yes --> D["Not high-risk, assessment documented (Article 6(4))"]
T -- yes --> TR["Disclosure duties (Article 50)"]
T -- no --> O["No trigger in the text quoted here"]
How to read this: follow the arrows from the intended purpose; the Article 50 check is separate and can also apply to a high-risk system (drawn only after the Annex III test).
Article 6(2). In addition to the high-risk AI systems referred to in paragraph 1, AI systems referred to in Annex III shall be considered to be high-risk.
Article 6(3). By derogation from paragraph 2, an AI system referred to in Annex III shall not be considered to be high-risk where it does not pose a significant risk of harm to the health, safety or fundamental rights of natural persons, including by not materially influencing the outcome of decision making.
The first subparagraph shall apply where any of the following conditions is fulfilled:
(a) the AI system is intended to perform a narrow procedural task;
(b) the AI system is intended to improve the result of a previously completed human activity;
(c) the AI system is intended to detect decision-making patterns or deviations from prior decision-making patterns and is not meant to replace or influence the previously completed human assessment, without proper human review; or
(d) the AI system is intended to perform a preparatory task to an assessment relevant for the purposes of the use cases listed in Annex III.
Notwithstanding the first subparagraph, an AI system referred to in Annex III shall always be considered to be high-risk where the AI system performs profiling of natural persons.
Article 6(4). A provider who considers that an AI system referred to in Annex III is not high-risk shall document its assessment before that system is placed on the market or put into service.
Figure 4. The eight Annex III areas, with the points the quiz uses
How to read this: Annex III lists uses ("intended to be used for ..."), grouped into eight areas; point 5 includes creditworthiness with its own fraud-detection exception.
Classification attaches to an intended use, so one model can sit in different tiers in different products. Article 6(3) is a set of conditions, not a free pass, and the text requires a documented assessment. Where the conditions are only partly met, the answer is a documented decision with counsel.
Try the quiz before opening each answer. Item 5 is deliberately ambiguous.
Check yourself: a tool only flags applications that are missing a required form. Which condition of Article 6(3) might let it fall outside high-risk, and what must the provider do?
Condition (a), "intended to perform a narrow procedural task". The provider must document its assessment before the system is placed on the market or put into service (Article 6(4)).
Where the text stands: what official EU sources said on 2026-10-22
How to read this: the right-hand column is the date on the source; an amending regulation adopted in July 2026 moved the 2024 dates for the high-risk rules.
- Articles 6, 12 and 14 sit in Chapter III, Sections 1 and 2, so for Annex III systems they follow the 2 December 2027 date. Article 50 is in Chapter IV and follows the general date.
- In the Official Journal text of 2026/1744, Article 1 inserts paragraphs 1a to 1c into Article 6 (safety components) and replaces Article 50(7). It amends none of Article 3(12), Article 6(2) to 6(4), Article 12, Article 14, Article 50(1) to 50(6) or Annex III, and the Publications Office consolidated text of 27.7.2026 (no legal effect) shows them unchanged, so the quotes here are the 2024 wording.
- Check the consolidated text on EUR-Lex and the Commission pages before relying on any date.
Check yourself: which quoted date applies to the Annex III high-risk requirements on the 2026-10-22 sources, and which document set it?
2 December 2027, in Article 113 as amended by Regulation (EU) 2026/1744. The original Article 113 gave 2 August 2026 as the general date and only moved Article 6(1) later.
Transparency: the Article 50 disclosure
How to read this: the middle column is the Regulation; the right column is a design reading, not a legal conclusion.
The Commission's AI Act page lists "Guidelines on transparency obligations for providers and deployers of certain AI systems"; read them for borderline cases.
Mapping the frameworks to what you produce
How to read this: one registry and one log can answer a NIST outcome and an Article; they are different documents with different status.
NIST says its framework "describes four specific functions" (GOVERN, MAP, MEASURE and MANAGE) and that "Governance is designed to be a cross-cutting function".
ISO/IEC 42001 is not mapped here: ISO's own page returned HTTP 403 on 2026-10-22, so this page makes no claim about its contents.
Change control and incident handling
Figure 5. The life of an AI system in the registry
stateDiagram-v2
accTitle: AI system lifecycle in the registry
accDescr: A system is proposed, classified and approved before going live. A change to the model, prompt, data or intended purpose sends it back to classification. An incident suspends it until a fix is verified. A system can be retired from live or suspended.
[*] --> Proposed
Proposed --> Classified: risk record written
Classified --> Approved: review passes
Approved --> Live: release
Live --> Classified: model, prompt, data or purpose changes
Live --> Suspended: incident
Suspended --> Live: fix verified
Suspended --> Retired: not worth fixing
Live --> Retired: decommissioned
Retired --> [*]
How to read this: every change to what the card describes returns to Classified, and Suspended is a state a system can be put into without a deployment.
Figure 6. An incident from alert to registry entry
sequenceDiagram
accTitle: Incident handling for an AI system
accDescr: The eval service alerts the on-call owner that sampled agreement fell. The owner uses the policy engine to send every case to a person. The orchestrator records the switch in the audit store. The owner opens an incident in the registry and lists affected decisions from the audit store. A verified fix returns the system through change control.
participant EV as Eval service
participant ON as On-call owner
participant PE as Policy engine
participant OR as Orchestrator
participant AS as Audit store
participant RG as Registry
EV->>ON: Alert: sampled agreement fell below the gate
ON->>PE: Switch off auto-approve (kill switch)
PE->>OR: Route every case to a person
OR->>AS: Append: switch event, who, when
ON->>RG: Open incident, set status Suspended
RG->>AS: Query decisions in the affected window
AS-->>RG: Decision ids and versions
Note over ON,RG: The incident record lists affected decisions, not only the cause.
alt Fix verified
ON->>RG: Close incident through change control
else Not fixable
ON->>RG: Retire the system
end
How to read this: the kill switch acts first, and the audit store turns "something went wrong" into a list of affected decisions.
Check yourself: a team swaps the model and tightens the prompt of a live system. Which state in Figure 5 does it return to, and what must happen before Live again?
Classified. The risk record and the card describe a version, so the change is reviewed and approved again before release.
Case files
Under the hood: Audit logging that survives an audit
Intuition
An audit log is a flight recorder for decisions: written as the decision happens, readable by someone who was not there, and impossible for the people being audited to edit quietly.
Mechanism
Article 12(1) and 12(2). High-risk AI systems shall technically allow for the automatic recording of events (logs) over the lifetime of the system. In order to ensure a level of traceability of the functioning of a high-risk AI system that is appropriate to the intended purpose of the system, logging capabilities shall enable the recording of events relevant for: ... (b) facilitating the post-market monitoring referred to in Article 72; ...
The field list in Article 12(3) opens "For high-risk AI systems referred to in point 1 (a), of Annex III", which is remote biometric identification. For other uses, such as employment or credit, the text above gives purposes and leaves the field list to you and counsel.
Figure 7. One decision writes to the audit store before it is released
sequenceDiagram
accTitle: A decision writing audit entries before release
accDescr: The orchestrator appends an entry when the request arrives, collects evidence from the retriever and the model gateway, asks the policy engine and the approval service, appends the evidence and the human action, and releases the decision only after the audit store acknowledges. If the audit store is down, no decision is released.
participant CA as Client app
participant OR as Orchestrator
participant RT as Retriever
participant MG as Model gateway
participant PE as Policy engine
participant AP as Approval service
participant AS as Audit store
CA->>OR: Request with request id
OR->>AS: Append: received, system and version, purpose
OR->>RT: Retrieve evidence
RT-->>OR: Chunk ids with document versions
OR->>MG: Prompt version and model id
MG-->>OR: Output and usage
OR->>PE: Check output
PE-->>OR: Escalate to a person
OR->>AP: Case with evidence
AP-->>OR: Reviewer id, action, reason code
OR->>AS: Append: evidence ids, output hash, policy result, human action
alt Audit store acknowledges
AS-->>OR: Entry hash
OR-->>CA: Decision released
else Audit store unavailable
OR-->>CA: No decision released (fail closed)
end
How to read this: the decision is released only after the final append is acknowledged, so a decision without a record cannot exist.
- Append a first entry at request time, with the system and version from the registry.
- Store ids and hashes of evidence (chunk ids, prompt hash, output hash), not raw personal data.
- Append the policy result and the human action with the reviewer's id and a reason code.
- Release the decision after the acknowledgement; fail closed if there is none.
- Copy the latest chain hash to storage the application team cannot change.
Immutability is a storage property. One documented example: S3 Object Lock "uses a write-once-read-many (WORM) model to store objects", and in compliance mode "a protected object version can't be overwritten or deleted by any user, including the root user in your AWS account" (AWS S3 User Guide, as of 2026-10-22).
Retention pulls two ways. Article 19(1) sets a floor for provider-held logs:
Article 19(1) (extract). ... the logs shall be kept for a period appropriate to the intended purpose of the high-risk AI system, of at least six months, unless provided otherwise in the applicable Union or national law, in particular in Union law on the protection of personal data.
The GDPR points the other way: personal data shall be "limited to what is necessary" and "kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary" (Regulation (EU) 2016/679, Article 5(1)(c) and (e)). Ids and hashes in the audit store, with content in a separate store that has its own retention, serve both. Counsel sets the periods.
What this means for architects
Under the hood: Data lineage
Intuition
Lineage answers "where did this answer come from?" by chaining ids from the answer back to the exact version of the source. The W3C PROV overview (a Working Group Note, 30 April 2013) defines the idea: "Provenance is information about entities, activities, and people involved in producing a piece of data or thing".
Mechanism
Figure 8. Lineage from a source document version to a human decision
flowchart LR
accTitle: Data lineage from source to decision
accDescr: A versioned source document is ingested by a run with an id. The run produces chunks whose ids come from the document version and text. Chunks go into an index entry with an index version. A retrieval event records the chunk ids it returned. The answer cites those chunks and a person records a decision on it.
SRC["Source document, version 4"] --> ING["Ingestion run (id, time)"]
ING --> CH["Chunk (id from document, version, text)"]
CH --> IDX["Index entry (embedding model, index version)"]
IDX --> RET["Retrieval event (query, filters, chunk ids)"]
RET --> ANS["Answer with citations"]
ANS --> DEC["Human decision (reviewer, action)"]
How to read this: each arrow is a record that carries an id, so a question can be answered by walking the arrows in either direction.
- Give every source document a version and keep superseded versions readable.
- Derive each chunk id from the document id, the version and the chunk text.
- Record the index version and embedding model with each index entry.
- Write the chunk ids a retrieval returned into the audit entry for that request.
- To assess a document change, query for every answer that cited a changed chunk.
Worked number (illustrative): a policy has 1,200 chunks and a revision changes 18. Each answer cites 4 chunks and 12,000 answers were issued last month. If chunks were cited uniformly at random, the chance an answer cited a changed chunk is 1 - C(1182,4) / C(1200,4) = 5.87 percent, so about 705 answers need review. Real traffic is not uniform, which is why you query instead of estimating.
What this means for architects
Under the hood: Model and system cards
Intuition
A card is a nutrition label for a model or system: short, with fixed headings, saying what it is for, how it was measured and where it should not be used.
Mechanism
Mitchell et al. propose model cards for models; Gebru et al. propose datasheets for datasets. The left column is the paper's own headings.
How to read this: the right column is how this course applies each heading to a whole system.
Gebru et al.'s datasheet has seven sections: Motivation, Composition, Collection Process, Preprocessing/cleaning/labeling, Uses, Distribution and Maintenance. Answer them for each dataset you control.
"System card" is not defined in either paper. In this course it means the same idea applied to the whole system, including prompts, retrieval, tools and oversight.
Figure 9. A card as a release artifact
flowchart LR
accTitle: A system card as a release artifact
accDescr: The registry supplies the intended purpose and the eval service supplies a run id and metrics. They are written into a versioned system card. A release gate checks that the card is complete, that its intended purpose matches the registry and that it cites an evaluation run. A pass releases the version and a fail blocks it.
REG["Registry: intended purpose"] --> CARD["System card (versioned file)"]
EV["Eval service: run id, metrics"] --> CARD
CARD --> GATE{"Release gate: complete, purpose matches, run cited?"}
GATE -- pass --> REL["Release"]
GATE -- fail --> BLK["Blocked"]
How to read this: the card is built from two sources of truth and checked by the pipeline, so it cannot drift from the system it describes.
Mitchell et al. say the sections "may be tailored depending on the model, context, and stakeholders", and that Training Data "May not be possible to provide in practice".
What this means for architects
Under the hood: Human oversight checkpoints
Intuition
A person can check work before the action, after it by sampling, or when the system asks. Which fits depends on how reversible the action is and how many decisions there are.
Mechanism
Article 14(1). High-risk AI systems shall be designed and developed in such a way, including with appropriate human-machine interface tools, that they can be effectively overseen by natural persons during the period in which they are in use.
Article 14(4), extract. ... natural persons to whom human oversight is assigned are enabled, as appropriate and proportionate: ... (b) to remain aware of the possible tendency of automatically relying or over-relying on the output produced by a high-risk AI system (automation bias), in particular for high-risk AI systems used to provide information or recommendations for decisions to be taken by natural persons; ... (d) to decide, in any particular situation, not to use the high-risk AI system or to otherwise disregard, override or reverse the output of the high-risk AI system; (e) to intervene in the operation of the high-risk AI system or interrupt the system through a ‘stop’ button or a similar procedure that allows the system to come to a halt in a safe state.
Article 14(5) is stricter but limited by its first words: "For high-risk AI systems referred to in point 1(a) of Annex III" (remote biometric identification). There, an identification must be "separately verified and confirmed by at least two natural persons" before any action or decision is taken on it.
Figure 10. Three checkpoint types
sequenceDiagram
accTitle: Three human oversight checkpoints
accDescr: Before the action, the policy engine requires approval and a reviewer decides with evidence. By sampling, the approval service pulls a share of auto-approved outputs and records agreement. By escalation, a low confidence score or rule hit routes the case to a reviewer. All results go to the audit store.
participant OR as Orchestrator
participant PE as Policy engine
participant AP as Approval service
participant RV as Reviewer
participant AS as Audit store
Note over OR,AS: A. Before the action
OR->>PE: Proposed action and risk tier
PE-->>OR: Approval required
OR->>AP: Case with evidence and confidence
AP->>RV: Evidence first, then the proposal
RV-->>AP: Approve, change or reject, with reason
AP->>AS: Append: reviewer, time spent, action
Note over OR,AS: B. By sampling, after the fact
AP->>RV: Random share of auto-approved outputs
RV-->>AP: Agree or disagree
AP->>AS: Append: agreement rate for the period
Note over OR,AS: C. By escalation
PE->>AP: Low confidence or rule hit
AP->>RV: Case routed to a person
RV-->>AP: Decision and reason
AP->>AS: Append: escalation and outcome
How to read this: A gates a single action, B measures the automatic path after the fact, and C lets the system hand a case to a person.
- Gate before the action when it is hard to reverse or the tier is high.
- Sample the automatic path so a drifting approve rate shows up as lower agreement.
- Escalate on low confidence or a rule hit, sized to reviewer capacity.
- Record reviewer id, time spent, action and reason for every human step.
- Track the override rate. NIST AI 100-1 says "Data about the frequency and rationale with which humans overrule AI system output in deployed systems may be useful to collect and analyze."
Over-reliance is documented. A systematic review in healthcare (Goddard, Roudsari and Wyatt, JAMIA 2012; abstract read on PubMed) calls automation bias "the tendency to over-rely on automation" and reports that workload and time constraint mediated it; mitigators include training and "updated confidence levels attached to DSS output". It covers clinical decision support, so treat it as a design pointer, not proof for every domain.
How many sampled outputs show a drop in agreement? Set p1 to 0.85 and compare.
With the defaults (one-sided 5 percent, power 80 percent) the widget gives about 149 items, 169 with the continuity correction. Page 8 explains the formula.
Check yourself: 20,000 decisions a day, 8 percent escalated, 90 seconds per review. How many hours of review does escalation alone create?
1,600 escalations x 90 seconds = 144,000 seconds = 40 hours a day. Oversight not staffed to that number becomes a rubber stamp or a backlog.
What this means for architects
Decision framework
Figure 11. Which governance path does a change take?
flowchart TD
accTitle: Governance path for a new or changed AI use
accDescr: A new or changed use is first checked against the registry and added if missing. If its intended use is in an Annex III area or an Annex I product it is treated as high-risk until counsel says otherwise. Otherwise a check for talking to people leads to a disclosure, and everything else keeps a registry entry, basic logs and change control.
N["New or changed AI use"] --> R{"In the registry with intended purpose?"}
R -- no --> RG["Register first"]
RG --> U
R -- yes --> U{"Annex III area or Annex I product?"}
U -- yes --> HR["Treat as high-risk until counsel says otherwise: records, oversight, monitoring"]
U -- no --> TP{"Talks to people or generates content?"}
TP -- yes --> DS["Add disclosure and log it"]
TP -- no --> BS["Registry entry, basic logs, change control"]
How to read this: nothing skips the registry, and the default for an Annex III use is the stricter path until a documented assessment says otherwise.
Comparison of the main options
Failure scenarios to design for
Worked example
Assumptions: 20,000 decisions a day; 6 KB per audit entry; 12 months of retention (chosen for illustration, not a legal period); 8 percent of decisions escalate to a reviewer at 90 seconds each; 2 percent of the others are sampled at 60 seconds each; a reviewer has 6 productive hours a day.
Storage is small; people are the cost. Escalating 4 percent instead of 8 halves the escalation hours to 20, a risk decision the owner records.
Code sample: a tamper-evident audit chain
Each entry stores the hash of the one before it, so changing an old record breaks the chain from that point. This is a sketch of the idea, not a storage design.
import hashlib, json
GENESIS = "0" * 64
def digest(prev, record):
body = json.dumps(record, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
return hashlib.sha256((prev + body).encode()).hexdigest()
def append(log, record):
prev = log[-1]["hash"] if log else GENESIS
log.append({"prev": prev, "record": record, "hash": digest(prev, record)})
def verify(log):
"""Index of the first entry that does not match, or None."""
prev = GENESIS
for i, e in enumerate(log):
if e["prev"] != prev or e["hash"] != digest(prev, e["record"]):
return i
prev = e["hash"]
return None
log = []
append(log, {"decision_id": "d-001", "event": "model_called", "prompt_version": "p-14"})
append(log, {"decision_id": "d-001", "event": "human_decision", "reviewer": "r-207", "action": "approve"})
append(log, {"decision_id": "d-002", "event": "model_called", "prompt_version": "p-14"})
print(verify(log))
log[1]["record"]["action"] = "reject"
print(verify(log))
How to read this: each row's previous hash equals the row above's entry hash; the values come from running the sample.
Check yourself: an attacker with write access edits entry 1 and recomputes the hash of every later entry. What does the chain itself fail to show?
Nothing: every link is consistent again. The only evidence is that the latest hash no longer matches a copy kept elsewhere, which is why that copy goes to write-once storage under another team's control.
Common mistakes
- Classifying the model instead of the use. Classify each intended purpose; one model can appear in several registry rows.
- Logging full prompts with personal data forever. Log ids and hashes; keep content in a store with its own retention.
- A person "in the loop" who sees only the AI's answer. Show evidence first, show confidence, and record overrides with a reason.
- Writing the card once. Version it with the system and fail the release gate when it is out of date.
- Copying dates from a summary. Quote the official page and date-stamp it.
- Letting the application team administer the audit log. Use separate credentials.
Try it
Time: 20 to 40 minutes. Pick an assistant you know, or an HR-policy chatbot.
- Write its registry record with the seven fields from Figure 2's table, including the intended purpose in one sentence.
- Classify it with Figure 3 and the quoted text. If the answer is "it depends", write down on what and whom you would ask.
- List the entries one decision should write to an audit store, using Figure 7.
- Choose one oversight checkpoint type and compute the reviewer hours it needs at your volume.
- Draft its system card headings.
Done when a colleague can take your registry record and answer the three auditor questions from the real-world problem without asking you.
Key takeaways
- Governance is records produced while the system runs: registry, risk record, card, audit log, monitoring data.
- The EU AI Act's classification attaches to intended use, and Article 6(3) is a documented-assessment exception, not a shortcut.
- On the official sources read on 2026-10-22, Annex III high-risk requirements apply from 2 December 2027 and Article 50 from 2 August 2026; check again.
- Append the audit entry before the decision is released, store ids and hashes, and keep immutability in the storage layer.
- Lineage ids turn "which answers used this document?" into a query.
- Oversight is a capacity and design problem: measure override rate, review time and sampled agreement. Nothing here is legal advice.
Self-check
1. Why is intended purpose a registry field and not a property of the model?
Article 3(12) defines it as the use the provider intends, in context, and Annex III lists uses. The same model can land in different places.
2. A system performs profiling of natural persons and meets an Article 6(3) condition. Is it high-risk?
Yes: Article 6(3) ends "shall always be considered to be high-risk where the AI system performs profiling of natural persons".
3. Which Article 12 content list applies only to remote biometric identification, and what does that mean for a credit system?
Article 12(3), which opens "For high-risk AI systems referred to in point 1 (a), of Annex III". A credit system is still under Article 12(1) and (2), which give purposes but no field list.
4. Why copy the latest hash of an audit chain to storage outside the application team's control?
Someone who can write to a chain can rewrite all of it; an external copy of the latest hash is the evidence it was not.
5. Why does a reviewer who approves 99 percent of cases in a few seconds worry an architect?
Article 14(4)(b) names over-reliance on the output (automation bias), and the Goddard review lists workload and time constraint as mediators. High approval with short review time suggests the checkpoint is not checking.
Further reading
- Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, Official Journal, 12 July 2024, and its amending Regulation (EU) 2026/1744, Official Journal, 24 July 2026. Not legal advice.
- European Commission, AI Act (last update 19 October 2026) and the AI Act Service Desk timeline.
- NIST, AI RMF 1.0, NIST AI 100-1, January 2023.
- Mitchell et al., Model Cards for Model Reporting, FAT* 2019.
- Gebru et al., Datasheets for Datasets, Communications of the ACM, December 2021.
Last verified: 2026-10-22
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This page ends Part C. Part D starts with cloud platforms, and that page is not linked here yet.