Review this lesson in the 24 hours before the exam — not weeks before.
The cheatsheet is most effective when it serves as activation of knowledge you already built through the module lessons, not as first exposure.
The Master Pattern
A thing that looks handled and a thing that has been verified to be handled are different claims.
Every wrong answer on the Professional exam is a form of collapsing this distinction. When you are unsure which answer is correct, ask: which option is verified, evidenced, or owned — and which one is merely assumed or asserted?
All 12 Trap Patterns
| # | Trap | One-line description | Module |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Right tradeoff word, wrong conclusion | Uses gain/give-up/reversal language correctly but inverts the content — quotes a gain as a give-up, or misidentifies the reversal cost | M4 |
| 2 | Collapsing layers | Conflates trained behavior (Anthropic's) with system-prompt enforcement (yours) — "Claude won't do X by nature" treated as equivalent to "the system prevents X" | M3 |
| 3 | Platform name ≠ config | Names an entry point (Claude Code, MCP, Bedrock) without specifying the configuration, permission posture, or integration that would actually enforce the requirement | M1 |
| 4 | Presence ≠ verified function | A control appears in the architecture diagram but has no named owner, no evidence artifact, and no test — it is asserted, not verified | M3 |
| 5 | Confidence ≠ correctness | Uses model output confidence as a proxy for accuracy — "95% confident" treated as "95% likely correct" | M1/M3 |
| 6 | Aggregate metric hides tail | Average accuracy looks acceptable while a specific demographic, document type, or query pattern is failing at a much worse rate | M2/M4 |
| 7 | Named-but-unowned = unenforced | A control is named in the compliance register but has no named owner and no evidence — it is a claim with the appearance of a control | M3 |
| 8 | Missing the third element | Gain and give-up are presented; reversal cost is omitted — the element that most often changes the decision | M4 |
| 9 | Scariest-sounding constraint isn't the binding one | A tight latency window or large document sounds alarming but is trivially met; the real bottleneck is corpus scale, not document size | M2/M3 |
| 10 | Everything reviewed = nothing reviewed | Routing 100% of decisions to a human is not the cautious choice — volume without triage collapses into rubber-stamping (consent fatigue) | M3 |
| 11 | Architectural complexity justified by the wrong reason | Multi-agent selected because of volume, budget, or executive enthusiasm — none of which are valid architectural drivers | M1 |
| 12 | An instruction asked to do a security layer's job | System-prompt instruction used to enforce data access control — instructions are not security boundaries; access control must make data structurally unreachable | M3 |
Decision Tables — Quick Reference
Architecture Pattern Selection
| Use when | Pattern |
|---|---|
| One transformation, context supplied | Single augmented LLM call |
| Steps known, stable, identical per request + auditability required | Fixed workflow |
| Path emerges during execution | Autonomous agent |
| Different specialisations + genuinely parallel sub-tasks | Multi-agent system |
Integration Mechanism Selection
| Use when | Mechanism |
|---|---|
| Multiple AI apps need standardised reuse of one system | MCP server |
| Single deterministic pipeline, owned internally | Direct API integration |
| Two orgs' agents must coordinate without internal exposure | Agent-to-agent protocol |
Reliability Control Placement
| Control | Layer |
|---|---|
| Retry | API call layer |
| Circuit breaker | Service boundary |
| Fallback chain | Orchestration layer |
Eval Method Selection
| Output type | Evaluation method |
|---|---|
| Checkable mechanically (format, schema, math) | Code-based |
| Requires interpretation (tone, reasoning quality) | Model-based (calibrated LLM judge) |
| Genuinely ambiguous or regulated | Human review |
HITL Routing Rule
Route to human when: low confidence AND (irreversible OR high cost)
Never route by volume alone.
Skills Distribution
| Requirement | Mechanism |
|---|---|
| Widest reach, entire org | Org-provisioned |
| Group-targeted, rollback needed | Plugin |
| Repo-scoped workflow | Project Skill |
| Programmatic, version-pinned | API Skill |
Feasibility Verdicts
Three and only three: feasible as scoped / feasible with constraints / not feasible
System Prompt — Four Required Components (in order)
- Role definition
- Testable criteria
- Boundary statements (explicit prohibition + named refusal response)
- Output format
A criterion is testable if you can write an eval test case that passes or fails based on it. Underspecification is a gap the model fills with its own assumption — differently each time.
Guardrail Layers — Type Column
| Layer | Type | Guarantee |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Input validation & injection screening | Deterministic | Yes |
| 2. System prompt constraints | Probabilistic | No |
| 3. Tool permission scoping | Deterministic | Yes |
| 4. Output filtering & moderation | Deterministic | Yes |
| 5. Human review | Human | — |
"What single control guarantees the agent cannot call the billing API?" → only removing it from the tool list (Layer 3).
Four Named Failure Modes
| Failure mode | Correct fix |
|---|---|
| Hallucination | Grounding: citations, retrieval requirements, output filtering for uncited claims — not a stronger instruction |
| Prompt injection | Screen retrieved content/tool outputs before injecting into context; treat external content as data not instructions |
| Data leakage | Least-privilege tool scoping; field-level access, not full record |
| Over-permissioned agents | Audit and trim tool list to the minimum required for the task |
Credential Storage
| Acceptable | Always wrong |
|---|---|
| Environment variables on deployment server | Hardcoded in source code |
| Dedicated secrets manager (Vault, AWS Secrets Manager) | Embedded in any prompt |
| — | In a README or documentation file |
Decision Logging — Three Audiences
| Audience | Needs |
|---|---|
| Affected user | Inputs + reason, in terms they can act on |
| Regulator | Durable queryable record of inputs, outputs, and decision path |
| Build team | Full trace: prompt, retrieved context, output, every routing step |
The Four AI Properties → Design Consequences
| Property | Design consequence |
|---|---|
| Non-determinism | Why evaluation frameworks exist |
| Knowledge boundary | Why retrieval and tools exist |
| Context as finite resource | Active context design, not passive "include everything" |
| Confidence ≠ correctness | Why HITL is architectural, not an afterthought |
The Four-Layer Safety Stack
| Layer | Blind spot |
|---|---|
| Trained behavior | Can't know your domain-specific rules |
| System-prompt instruction | Instructions can be ignored, misinterpreted, or injected past |
| Runtime screening | Can't see indirect injection via retrieved content/tool outputs |
| Authorization | Timing attacks and race conditions if not atomic |
Each layer's blind spot is what the next layer catches. Removing any layer leaves the next layer's predecessor's blind spot exposed.
Outcome Document — Six Fields
- Use case + scope boundary
- Metric before (same units as metric after — unrecoverable after launch)
- Metric after (same definition as before)
- Auditable control
- Measurement owner (named)
- Reuse potential
42-Term Master Glossary
Module 1
Non-determinism — Same input → different outputs. Consequence: why evals exist.
Knowledge boundary — Can't reliably supply rare/private/post-cutoff knowledge from memory. Consequence: why retrieval and tools exist.
Context as a finite resource — Fixed token budget; what enters it is an active design decision.
Confidence is not correctness — A wrong output can be as fluent as a right one. Consequence: why HITL is architectural.
Entry point / build-time interface / delivery route — Claude Code (entry point) / MCP (build-time) / Bedrock-Vertex-Foundry (delivery route).
Tools / Subagents / Hooks / Skills — Act / Isolate-parallelize / Guarantee / Package-a-procedure.
Feasibility verdict — Feasible as scoped / feasible with constraints / not feasible.
Prompt caching — Matches on prefix; only pays off if frequency clears TTL (5 min default); writes cost more on first use.
Module 2
Code-based / model-based / human-review eval — Grading ladder: use cheapest reliable method; escalate only when the tier below can't be trusted.
Judge calibration — Running an LLM judge against human-labeled outputs before trusting it at scale. Uncalibrated judge = worse than no automated grade.
POC-to-production gap — Cost, latency, reliability, and failure modes are invisible in a developer-supervised demo at low volume.
Retry / Circuit breaker / Fallback chain — API call layer / service boundary / orchestration layer.